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Policy Uncertainty and Firm Cash Holdings
Abstract
This research examines the relation between government economic policy uncertainty and firm
cash holdings. We find evidence that policy uncertainty is positively related to firm cash holdings
due to firms’ precautionary motives and, to a lesser extent, investment delays. The relation between
policy uncertainty and cash holdings is more pronounced for firms dependent on government
spending and extends beyond business cyclicality. Further analysis indicates that the effects of
policy uncertainty on corporate cash holdings are distinct from those of political, market, or other
macroeconomic uncertainty.
JEL Classifications: G18, G32, G38
Keywords: Policy Uncertainty; Cash Holdings; Precautionary Motives; Financial Constraints
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1. Introduction
Government economic policy uncertainty can have detrimental effects on the economy.
Previous research suggests that uncertainty related to government spending, tax, and regulatory
and monetary policies exacerbated the 2007–2009 Great Recession and slowed the economic
recovery (Stock and Watson, 2012; Baker, Bloom, and Davis, 2016). The level of policy
uncertainty in the United States increased significantly during the period 1985–2012, peaking
around the government’s failure in raising federal debt-ceiling in August 2011 and the fiscal cliff
crisis at the end of 2012 whereby several previously enacted laws would come into effect
simultaneously, potentially leading to an increase in taxes and a decrease in spending.1 Economic
policy uncertainty was suggested to have caused more than one-percentage-point decrease in the
U.S. real gross domestic product (GDP) and the loss of over one million jobs during the period
2011-2012 (source: Wall Street Journal, April 28, 2013).2 Given the profound impact of policy
uncertainty on the economy, academic researchers have shown increasing interest in investigating
the effects of policy uncertainty on corporate policies.
Recent studies document that government economic policy uncertainty has negative
financial and real effects. Gulen and Ion (2016) and Nguyen and Phan (2017) report that firms are
more likely to delay investments, particularly those that are irreversible, amid high economic
policy uncertainty. Policy uncertainty can increase the cost of external financing, which

1

The fiscal cliff was related to the expiration of the Bush tax cuts of 2001 and the planned spending cuts under the

Budget Control Act of 2011.
2

Available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323789704578443431277889520, last accessed on

May 22, 2016.
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exacerbates firms’ financial constraints (Pástor and Veronesi, 2013; Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajsek,
2014).
Cash is an important and liquid corporate asset. The increasing trend in cash holdings of
U.S. firms has attracted attention from investors and academic researchers. Bates, Kahle, and Stulz
(2009) report that the average cash-to-assets ratio of U.S. industrial firms more than doubled
during the period 1980–2006, increasing from 10.5% to 23%. Previous studies offer several
explanations for corporate cash holdings, including transaction costs (Mulligan, 1997),
precautionary motives (Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 1999; Han and Qiu, 2007; Bates
et al., 2009; Khieu and Pyles, 2012), corporate governance (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007;
Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell, 2008; Kuan, Li, and Chu, 2011), business organization structure
(Locorotondo, Dewaelheyns, and Hulle, 2014), tax incentives (Foley, Hartzell, Titman, and Twite,
2007; Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson, 2013), product market competition (Fresard, 2010), and
idiosyncratic risk (Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu, 2001). However, little is known about the
link between government economic policy uncertainty and corporate liquidity. Our research fills
this gap in the literature by examining the effect of policy uncertainty on corporate cash holdings.
Policy uncertainty can affect corporate cash holdings in a number of ways. Since policy
uncertainty decreases asset returns and increases the cost of external financing, which exacerbate
firms’ financial constraints (Gilchrist et al., 2014; Pástor and Veronesi, 2013; and Brogaard and
Detzel, 2015), firms are motivated to increase cash reserves to buffer against financial shocks and
maintain smooth operation. From the real option perspective, firms may choose to delay
investment amid high uncertainty (Bernanke, 1983; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Gulen and Ion,
2016), which also leads to an increase in cash holdings. Since policy uncertainty tends to be
4
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temporary, increased cash holdings can provide flexibility that allows firms to exploit future
profitable investment opportunities when uncertainty recedes. Policy uncertainty can also increase
managerial conservatism (Panousi and Papanikolaou, 2012), inducing firms to hold more cash,
which is the most liquid asset. For these reasons, we expect a positive relation between policy
uncertainty and cash holdings.
We begin by examining the effect of government economic policy uncertainty on corporate
cash holdings. Similar to recent studies related to policy uncertainty (Panousi and Papanikolaou,
2012; Pástor and Veronesi, 2013; Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajsek, 2014; Gulen and Ion, 2016;
Nguyen and Phan, 2017), we use the economic policy uncertainty index developed by Baker et al.
(2016; hereinafter labeled BBD index) as the measure of government economic policy uncertainty.
Using a sample that includes 119,322 firm-year observations of 13,981 unique firms over the
period 1986–2015, we find that policy uncertainty is positively related to corporate cash holdings.
Further analysis indicates that precautionary motives and, to a lesser extent, investment delays
explain the positive relation between policy uncertainty and the level of cash. Our findings are not
susceptible to possible alternative explanations such as managerial agency problems or external
financing.
Since the BBD index and corporate cash holdings follow an increasing trend over the
sample period, one may be concerned about a possible spurious relation between the two.
Alternatively, policy uncertainty tends to be countercyclical whereas firms may hold more cash in
the down state of the economy, which raises a possibility that our observed positive relation
between policy uncertainty and corporate cash reserves is simply driven by business cyclicality.
We perform two analyses to address these concerns. In the first analysis, we examine the relation
between policy uncertainty and corporate cash holdings conditional on firms’ dependence on
5
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government spending. We find that the positive relation between policy uncertainty and cash
holdings is more pronounced for firms dependent on government spending, implying that
government economic policy uncertainty affects corporate cash holdings rather than the two being
spuriously related. In the second analysis, we sort firms into subgroups depending on whether they
belong to pro-cyclical or countercyclical industries. Our results indicate that the positive relation
between corporate cash holdings and policy uncertainty is significant for both subgroups of firms,
suggesting that the relation extends beyond business cyclicality.
We run several additional tests to ensure the robustness of our findings. First, policy
uncertainty and corporate cash holdings can be jointly correlated with unobservable variables, such
as investment opportunities, which raises endogeneity concern. We use the IV regression model
to address this endogeneity concern and find that our results are robust to endogeneity correction.
Second, the BBD index may capture the effects of general economic uncertainty that potentially
confound our finding, therefore, we control for several proxies for economic uncertainty including
the annual standard deviation of firm profit growth, the uncertainty of equity markets, economic
uncertainty measured by GDP forecast dispersion, and aggregate macroeconomic uncertainty
measures suggested by Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng (2015). Our finding is qualitatively unchanged.
Third, the BBD index may pick up the effects of some other non-policy-related economic
uncertainty, such as labor market variations, currency uncertainty or oil shocks, which tend to
affect corporate cash reserves. Following Gulen and Ion (2016)’s suggestion that the U.S. and
Canadian economies are closely linked and a shock that affects the economic uncertainty in the
U.S. is likely to affect the economic uncertainty in Canada as well, we use the residuals of the
regression of the BBD news-based index for the U.S. on the Canadian BBD news-based index and
other macroeconomic variables as a proxy for policy uncertainty. We find that our results continue
6
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to hold. Fourth, some previous research reports that political uncertainty, which is typically
associated with elections, can affect corporate policies. To alleviate a concern that policy
uncertainty merely picks up the effects of political uncertainty, we control for political uncertainty
in the cash holdings regressions but our results are qualitatively similar.
Our research contributes to a burgeoning stream of literature that studies the effects of
policy uncertainty on corporate behavior and firm value and to a more established stream of
literature on the determinants of corporate liquidity. We show that policy uncertainty relates
significantly to corporate cash holdings, which is one of the most important corporate financial
policies. We uncover the drivers, i.e., precautionary motives and, to a lesser extent, investment
delays, of the positive relation between policy uncertainty and corporate cash holdings. Our
findings provide timely implications for corporate managers, investors, and policy makers given
the recent sharp increase in policy uncertainty and the acute interest in promoting business growth
and job creation.
Our research is related to some recent studies on the relation between uncertainty and firm
cash holdings. Gao, Grinstein, and Wang (2017) find a positive effect of systematic uncertainty,
which is obtained from the regression of implied volatility of firms’ traded stock options on the
implied volatility of the S&P 500 index (VIX), on firm cash holdings through firms’ future cash
needs and costs of external financing channels. However, our research focuses particularly on the
effects of government economic policy uncertainty, which is different from their systematic
uncertainty in measurement, time frame, and implications (Baker et al., 2016; Nguyen and Phan,
2017). Another research related to ours is Demir and Ersan (2017), which examines the relation
between policy uncertainty and corporate cash holdings in emerging (BRIC) economies over the
period 2006-2015. Our research examines the relation between policy uncertainty and cash
7
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holdings of firms in a single country, the U.S., which is not susceptible to unobserved time-varying
country social, economic, and political conditions that may correlate with policy uncertainty.
Moreover, our sample period (from 1986-2015) spans several business cycles, thus, our results are
unlikely to be confounded by the consequences of the recent Great Recession.
2. Empirical Prediction
Policy uncertainty may increase firms’ future cash flow volatility, thereby increasing the
deadweight costs of financial distress. Previous research reports that policy uncertainty reduces
asset returns and increases the cost of external financing, which exacerbate firms’ financial
constraints (Pástor and Veronesi, 2013; Gilchrist et al., 2014; Brogaard and Detzel, 2015). Facing
possible external financing uncertainty and higher costs of capital amid high policy uncertainty,
firms are more likely to increase their cash reserves to buffer against financial shocks and maintain
smooth operation and investment. Moreover, firms are likely to delay investments amid high
policy uncertainty (Gulen and Ion, 2016; Nguyen and Phan, 2017), which may also lead to larger
cash holdings. Obviously, firms can distribute cash that is not used for investment to investors but
they might consider the trade-off between reducing unprofitable cash holdings and costly external
financing due to market frictions if they have to raise external funds to support investments in the
future when policy uncertainty recedes. Since policy uncertainty is unlikely to be permanent,
holding cash could be more cost effective than paying out first and raising external funds later.3
Policy uncertainty also heightens managerial conservatism (Panousi and Papanikolaou, 2012).
Among different classes of assets, cash is the most liquid that could be the asset of choice for
3

We examine the effect of policy uncertainty on corporate payouts in the robustness check section and find that firms

actually decrease payout during the periods of high policy uncertainty.

8

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3051576

conservative managers during the periods of high policy uncertainty. Given the foregoing
discussions, we predict a positive relation between policy uncertainty and firm cash holdings.

3. Samples, Variables Construction, and Descriptive Statistics
We obtain U.S. public firms’ accounting data from Compustat and stock price and return
data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) databases. Since the first year that
the BBD index is available is 1985, our sample period begins in 1986 and ends in 2015. Following
the literature, we exclude firms from the utility and financial industries from our sample because
these firms are highly regulated and their cash holdings may have a different meaning.
We use the BBD policy uncertainty index constructed by Baker et al. (2016) as the measure
of government economic policy uncertainty. The BBD index is constructed based on the monthly
value-weighted average of three components that include the frequency of newspaper articles
containing key terms related to policy matters and economic uncertainty, the dispersion in
economic forecasts of government spending and consumer price index (CPI) as a proxy for
uncertainty about future fiscal and monetary policy, and uncertainty about future changes in the
federal tax codes measured by the dollar impact of tax provisions set to expire in the near future.
The weights for the news-based, forecaster disagreement and expiration tax code components are
1/2, 1/3, and 1/6, respectively. In our analysis, we construct the policy uncertainty measure as the
natural logarithm of the average of monthly BBD index values in a given year.
The first component of the BBD index, the news-based uncertainty, captures the intensity
of concerns about policy uncertainty. This component is constructed based on the news articles
from 10 large newspapers including the Boston Globe, the Chicago Tribune, the Dallas Morning
News, the Los Angeles Times, the Miami Herald, the New York Times, the San Francisco
9
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Chronicle, USA Today, the Wall Street Journal, and the Washington Post. Specifically, an article
will be counted if it contains terms in all three categories related to uncertainty, the economy, and
policy including: ‘uncertainty’ or ‘uncertain’, one of the terms ‘economic’ or ‘economy’, and one
of the terms ‘congress’, ‘deficit’, ‘federal reserve’, ‘legislation’, ‘regulation’, or ‘white house’.
Baker et al. (2016) find that the news-based uncertainty increases with intense news coverage of
events such as the Gulf Wars, terrorist attack (9/11), the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, the 2011
debt-ceiling dispute, and stock market crash (Black Monday).
The second component, the dispersion in economic forecasts of government spending and
consumer price index (CPI), is measured as the average of the interquartile ranges of Consumer
Price Index (CPI) and federal, state and local governments spending forecasts. The fiscal and
monetary policies data are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia's Survey of
Professional Forecasters. The third component, the level of uncertainty related to future changes
to the tax code, is measured by the discounted value of the revenue effects of all tax provisions set
to expire over the next ten years. The federal tax code provision expiration data are acquired from
the Congressional Budget Office.
We report the descriptive statistics of the sample in Table 1. The sample consists of 119,322
firm-year observations of 13,981 unique firms. Cash-to-assets is the ratio of cash to the book value
of assets (i.e., Compustat items CH/AT). Cash-to-net assets is the ratio of cash to net assets, where
net assets are defined as the book value of assets minus cash. Policy uncertainty is the natural
logarithm of the average monthly BBD index in a given year. Market-to-book is defined as the
market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. Leverage is the ratio of the book value
of debt to the book value of assets. Other variables are defined in Appendix A. We winsorize the
continuous variables at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the effects of outliers. The sample
10
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average cash-to-assets ratio (cash-to-net assets ratio) is 14.04% (30.20%). The average value of
BBD index is 104.76, which is similar to those reported by Baker et al. (2016) and Gulen and Ion
(2016).
[Insert Table 1 about here]
4. Empirical Models, Results, and Discussions
4.1. Baseline Regressions
Our cash holdings model is similar to the one adopted by previous research (e.g., Opler et
al., 1999; Harford et al., 2008, Bates et al., 2009; Phan et al., 2017) and has the following form:
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In equation (1), the dependent variable is either the cash-to-assets or cash-to-net assets ratio. The
test variable is policy uncertainty, PU, which is proxied by the BBD index. We use policy
uncertainty lagged by one period to alleviate endogeneity concern. Consistent with our prediction,
we expect the coefficient

to be positive and statistically significant. We control for several

factors that are documented in the literature as having power to explain corporate cash holdings,
including firm size, growth opportunities, cash flows, net working capital, capital expenditures,
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financial leverage, industry cash flow volatility, R&D investments, and acquisition activities.4 It
is worth noting that since the cash level model explicitly controls for the level of firm investment
in the forms of capital expenditures, R&D, and acquisitions, the model captures both the direct
effect of policy uncertainty on the level of cash, due to precautionary purposes, through the standalone policy uncertainty variable and its indirect effect on cash holdings due to investment delays
through the investment variables. The model further includes firm fixed effects to control for
unobserved time-invariant firm characteristics or industry fixed effects to control for industry-wide
common factors. We do not control for year fixed effects because BBD index is the same for all
firms in a given year (Gulen and Ion, 2016; Nguyen and Phan, 2017). Finally, we use the
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firms for statistical inference.
Table 2 reports the results of the corporate cash holdings regressions. Because the results
are qualitatively similar when the dependent variable is either the cash-to-assets or cash-to-net
assets ratio, we report the cash-to-assets regression results for discussion (but the results for cashto-net assets regressions are available from the authors). Consistent with our expectation, the
estimated coefficients of policy uncertainty are positive, ranging from 0.011 to 0.016, and
statistically significant at the 1% level.5 The economic effect of policy uncertainty on corporate

4

Similar to the previous research (e.g., Opler et al., 1999; Foley et al., 2007; Harford et al., 2008, Bates et al., 2009,

Phan et al., 2017), we control for contemporaneous firm characteristics in the cash level model. However, our findings
hold if we use the lagged firm characteristics as controls.
5

In an unreported analysis, we examine the effect of policy uncertainty on corporate excess cash. Specifically, we run

a cash level regression model that includes all control variables but without policy uncertainty and obtain the predicted
level of cash. Excess cash is calculated as the difference between the actual and predicted level of cash. Then we
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cash holdings is also important. Our calculation indicates that, holding other variables fixed at their
sample means, a one standard deviation increase in policy uncertainty above its sample mean is
associated with a 0.39 to 0.64 percentage-point increase in corporate cash holdings, which is
equivalent to 2.7% to 4.6% of the sample mean. Turning to the control variables, the coefficients
of capex and acquisitions are all negative and statistically significant, indicating a negative relation
between investment and the level of cash. To the extent that policy uncertainty negatively affects
investment (Gulen and Ion, 2016), the negative relation between corporate investment and cash
holdings implies an indirect and positive effect of policy uncertainty on the level of cash through
the investment channel.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
To put the economic effects of policy uncertainty on cash holdings due to the precautionary
motives and investment delays in perspective, based on the estimates reported in Column 1 of
Table 2, we find that one standard deviation increase in policy uncertainty is associated with an
increase of 0.42% (42 basis points) in cash after controlling for the investment effects. On the other
hand, one standard deviation increase in capital expenditures (R&D) is associated with a decrease
(increase) of 0.02% (0.0055%) in cash. These comparisons of the magnitude of effects underscore
our claim that the precautionary motives have a much larger economic impact on cash holdings as
compared to the investment channel.
4.2. Firm Dependence on Government Spending and Business Cyclicality

regress excess cash on policy uncertainty measure and find a positive relation between the two, which is consistent
with our main finding. We thank a referee for suggesting this analysis.
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Since the BBD index and corporate cash holdings follow an increasing trend over the
sample period, one may be concerned about a possible spurious relation between the two. To
address this concern, we examine the relation between policy uncertainty and corporate cash
holdings conditional on firms’ dependence on government spending. In particular, firms that are
more dependent on government spending are more likely to be adversely affected by policy
uncertainty, potentially leading to larger corporate cash holdings. Thus, policy uncertainty is
expected to have a stronger effect on the level of cash of those firms that are more prone to the
components of policy uncertainty, such as government spending. We follow Belo, Gala, and Li
(2013) in measuring industry sensitivity to government spending by the ratio of each industry’s
sales purchased by the government using the data from the Benchmark Input-Output Accounts
provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). We construct the Sensitivity to government
spending dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm’s industry sensitivity to government
spending is above the sample median, and 0 otherwise. We rerun the corporate cash holdings
model with Sensitivity to government spending dummy and its interaction with policy uncertainty
and report the results in Columns 1-2 of Table 3. The coefficients of policy uncertainty remain
positive and significant, whereas the coefficients of the interaction terms are also positive and
significant, indicating that firms with sales sensitive to government spending hold larger cash
reserves during the periods of high policy uncertainty.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
In an additional analysis, we use the data on government contracts, which are available
from year 2000 onward, to estimate firm-level sensitivity to government spending.6 Due to the

6

Data on government contracts are publicly available at https://www.usaspending.gov/Pages/Default.aspx.
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large government contract dataset and the lack of common identifiers between the government
contractors and Compustat firms, we use a fuzzy matching algorithm (provided by the SAS
statistical software) and company names to match government contractors with Compustat firms.
We then construct the Government contract dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm’s sales
to the government in a given year is greater than $1 million, and 0 otherwise. We rerun the
corporate cash holdings model augmented with this dummy variable and its interaction with policy
uncertainty and report the results in Columns 3-4 of Table 3. The coefficients of policy uncertainty
remain positive and significant, whereas the coefficient of the interaction term is positive and
significant in Column 4 that controls for firm fixed effects. This result indicates that firms with
larger sales to the government increases cash reserves when policy uncertainty increases. Taken
together, the evidence indicates that government economic policy uncertainty affects corporate
cash holdings rather than the two being spuriously related.
Since policy uncertainty tends to be counter-cyclical while firms may hold larger cash
reserves in the bad states of the economy, one may argue that the positive relation between policy
uncertainty and cash reserves could simply be driven by business cyclicality. To alleviate this
concern, we identify countercyclical and pro-cyclical industries based on the asset liquidation
values proxied by firms’ sales cyclicality (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Sharpe, 1994; Almeida and
Campello, 2007). If the relation between policy uncertainty and firm cash holdings is simply driven
by business cyclicality, we expect the results to hold for only pro-cyclical industries. We estimate
the coefficients of correlation between a firm’s sales and the annual gross national product (GNP)
over the sample period, and calculate industry average of the correlation coefficients of the firms
in the same 2-digit SIC industry. We sort industries into the pro-cyclical (countercyclical)
subgroup if their average correlation coefficients are above (below) the sample median and then
15
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rerun the corporate cash holdings models by subgroups. The estimation results reported in Table
4 indicate that policy uncertainty has a positive and significant effect on the level of cash of firms
in both industry subgroups, implying that policy uncertainty’s effects on firm cash holdings extend
beyond business cyclicality.7
[Insert Table 4 about here]
4.3. Additional Analyses of the Drivers of the Relation between Policy Uncertainty and Cash
Holdings
The positive relation between policy uncertainty and cash holdings could arise from firm
precautions and investment delays. To further establish the direct relation between policy
uncertainty and corporate cash holdings due to precautionary purposes, we conduct a
complementary analysis along firms’ investment irreversibility. The intuition is that firms with
irreversible investments are more likely to delay investments amid high policy uncertainty (Gulen
and Ion, 2016; Nguyen and Phan, 2017), implying that these firms’ larger cash holdings arise from
investment delays. On the other hand, firms with low or no irreversible investments are less likely
to delay investments during periods of high policy uncertainty, hence a positive relation between
policy uncertainty and cash holdings of these firms indicates precautionary motives.
We use two different proxies for investment irreversibility. The first proxy is capital
intensity, which is calculated as the ratio of the net fixed assets to the book value of assets. A
higher level of capital intensity indicates a higher level of investment irreversibility (Gulen and
Ion, 2016). We construct the High irreversible investment dummy variable that takes a value of 1
7

Since we control for firm fixed effects in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4, we cannot perform the Wald test to compare

the magnitude of the coefficients of policy uncertainty in these two columns.
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if a firm’s capital intensity measure is above the sample median in a given year, and 0 otherwise.
We employ industry redeployability scores as the second proxy for irreversible investments using
information from the 1997 capital flow table from the BEA (Kim and Kung, 2013). The table
provides information about the capital expenditures of 123 industries, sorted into 180 asset
categories. The redeployability score for each asset category is the ratio of the number of industries
using that asset category. An industry’s redeployability score is the value-weighted average of the
redeployability scores for each asset category in which the industry invests, whereas the weight
for each asset category is its share in the industry’s total capital expenditures.8 By construction, a
lower industry redeployability score means a higher level of investment irreversibility. We
construct the Low redeployability dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm’s industry
redeployability score is below the sample median, and 0 otherwise.
We rerun the corporate cash holdings regressions that include proxies for investment
irreversibility and their interactions with policy uncertainty and report the results in Table A.1 in
the Internet Appendix. The results indicate that the coefficients of policy uncertainty are positive
and statistically significant across specifications, suggesting a strong and robust direct effect of
policy uncertainty on the corporate cash holdings of an average firm. On the other hand, the
coefficient of the interaction between policy uncertainty and investment irreversibility proxy is
positive and statistically significant in only Column 1, indicating a weak indirect effect of policy
uncertainty on cash holdings through investment delays.

8

The Bureau of Economic Analysis uses the North American Industry System (NAICS) industries code so we merge

the data with our sample using the two-digit NAICS code.
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In the next analysis, we examine the effects of firms’ financial constraints on the link
between policy uncertainty and corporate cash holdings. Since financially constrained firms
typically do not have sufficient internal funds to finance investments and lack access to external
capital, they are less likely to increase cash reserves amid uncertainty unless for precautionary
purposes (Han and Qiu, 2007; Khieu and Pyles, 2012). We run corporate cash holdings regressions
separately for subgroups of firms sorted on the following measures of financial constraints: S&P
long-term credit ratings, firm size, market-to-book ratio, Whited-Wu index (Whited and Wu,
2006), and size-age index (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010). The results reported in Table 5 indicate
positive effects of policy uncertainty on the level of cash holdings for both subgroups, which
implies that both precautionary motives and investment delays explain the positive relation
between policy uncertainty and corporate cash holdings.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Managerial agency problems can affect the level of cash holdings (Harford et al., 2008),
which may confound the relation between policy uncertainty and cash holdings if the regressions
do not control for these problems. We rerun the cash level regressions while controlling for
governance mechanisms that measure investor oversight by institutional investors (institutional
ownership) and managerial entrenchment resulting from antitakeover provisions (GIM index or
BCF index). The GIM index, developed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), is the number of
anti-takeover provisions adopted by a firm. The BCF index constructed by Bebchuk, Cohen, and
Ferrell (2009) is the managerial entrenchment index measuring the adoption of six important antitakeover provisions including staggered boards, supermajority requirements for mergers,
supermajority requirements for charter amendments, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments,
18
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poison pills, and golden parachutes. By construction, a larger (smaller) institutional ownership
implies better (worse) corporate governance. A larger (smaller) GIM index or BCF index value
indicates worse (better) corporate governance. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2006) argue that these
governance mechanisms can substantially affect the ability of investors to pressure managers to
use cash efficiently. The estimated results reported in Table A.2 in the Internet Appendix indicate
that the positive effect of policy uncertainty on corporate cash holdings is not sensitive to
controlling for corporate governance measures. In an alternative specification, we rerun the test
for subgroups of firms sorted on governance measures relative to their respective sample medians
but the results are qualitatively similar.
If firms raise external financing and hold the cash proceeds to buffer against policy
uncertainty, which is a precautionary move, it will also explain the positive relation between policy
uncertainty and the level of cash. We run the net debt and net equity issues regressions to gauge
the effects of policy uncertainty on external financing and report the results in Panels A and B,
respectively, of Table A.3 in the Internet Appendix. The dependent variable in Panel A is net debt
issues which are calculated as the ratio of the change in total liabilities to total book value of assets
(Hovakimian, Hovakimian and Tehranian, 2004; Lewis and Tan, 2016). The dependent variable
in Panel B is net equity issues, which are estimated as the ratio of net cash from issuing and
repurchasing equities to lagged assets. The results in both panels indicate that firms actually
decrease external financing during high policy uncertainty periods. This evidence is also consistent
with higher external financing costs amid policy uncertainty documented by Gilchrist et al. (2014).
Intuitively, firms can pay out unused cash when policy uncertainty is high and access
external financing markets later to raise funds when needed. However, policy uncertainty tends to
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be temporary and firms incur transactions costs when raising external financing, making paying
out first and raising external financing later less appealing. We examine the effect of policy
uncertainty on total payouts and report the results in Table A.4 in the Internet Appendix. We find
that firms actually decrease payouts during the periods of high policy uncertainty, which lends
further support to the precautionary motives of cash holdings.
In summary, we investigate alternative explanations for the relation between policy
uncertainty and firm cash holdings and find precautionary motives and, to a certain extent,
investment delays as plausible explanations for the positive relation between the two.
5. Robustness Checks and Additional Analyses
5.1. Instrumental Variable (IV) Regressions
Policy uncertainty and corporate cash holdings can be jointly correlated with unobservable
variables, such as investment opportunities, which implies that our cash holdings regression model
could be subject to the omitted variable bias, a source of endogeneity. We use the IV regression
model to address this endogeneity concern. In particular, we use the partisan polarization measure
suggested by McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (1997), Poole and Rosenthal (2000), and Gulen and
Ion (2016) as an instrument for policy uncertainty. This measure tracks legislators’ ideological
position over time. McCarty (2004) argues that partisan polarization hinders legislation building,
leading to policy gridlock and greater variation in policy. Political polarization is a valid instrument
in our analysis because it is directly related to policy uncertainty but there is no obvious reason to
argue that it has a direct impact on the level and value of cash other than through policy uncertainty.
We report the results of the level of cash IV regression in Table 6. Columns 1 and 2 do not
control for firm fixed effects but Columns 3 and 4 do. The first-stage results of the IV regression
20
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model reported in Columns 1 and 3 of Table 6 indicate that the coefficients of the instrument are
positive (0.496 and 0.690, respectively) and significant at the 1% level, confirming its relevance.
The Wu-Hausman endogeneity test statistic validates our endogeneity concern. The KleibergenPaap underidentification test statistic and the Cragg-Donald weak identification test statistic
indicate that our selected instrument is relevant. The results of the outcome regression reported in
Columns 2 and 4 of Table 6 indicate that the coefficients of instrumented PU are positive (0.458
and 0.195, respectively) and highly significant, suggesting that our findings are robust to
endogeneity correction.9
[Insert Table 6 about here]
5.2. Control for Other Types of Uncertainty
The BBD index may capture the effects of general economic uncertainty that potentially
confound our finding of a positive relation between policy uncertainty and cash holdings. We
address this concern by controlling for several proxies for economic uncertainty suggested by
Bloom (2009) in our regressions. First, we calculate the annual cross-sectional standard deviation
of firm profit growth as a proxy for future profitability variation, where firm profit growth is
measured as the ratio of the change in net income to average sales. Second, we control for the
uncertainty of the equity markets proxied by the standard deviation of monthly stock returns and
the Chicago Board Options Exchange’s VXO index of implied volatility. Third, we use the GDP
forecast data from the Philadelphia Federal Reserve’s Livingston survey to calculate the
9

We note that the coefficient estimates of policy uncertainty in Table 6 are significantly larger than those reported in

Table 2, which could be because the IV models identify the local average treatment effect of the endogenous variable
on the outcome variable (Imbens and Angrist, 1994).
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coefficient of variation of GDP forecast as a proxy for expected economic growth uncertainty.
Finally, we control for an alternative measure of aggregate macroeconomic uncertainty suggested
by Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng (2015). We augment the corporate cash holdings model with these
five general economic uncertainty proxies but our finding is qualitatively unchanged (the results
are not reported for brevity but they are available from the authors).
To alleviate concern about possible collinearity between policy uncertainty and economic
uncertainty when their proxies are included in the same regression, we further use a 2-step
regression model to isolate the effects of economic policy uncertainty from those of economic
uncertainty. Specifically, in the first step, we regress the BBD index on the five economic
uncertainty variables mentioned above and obtain the residuals. We then rerun the cash holdings
model using the residuals as a proxy for policy uncertainty. The results reported in Table A.5 in
the Internet Appendix indicate that our finding persists.
The BBD index may pick up some other non-policy-related economic uncertainty, such as
labor market variations, currency uncertainty or oil shocks, which tend to affect the level of cash.
This possibility implies a potential error-in-measurement problem that could bias the model
estimation. It is noteworthy that the U.S. and Canadian economies are closely linked and a shock
that affects the economic uncertainty in the U.S. is likely to affect the economic uncertainty in
Canada as well. Thus, to address the possible error-in-measurement problem, we follow Gulen and
Ion (2016) in estimating the BBD news-based index for the U.S. as a function of the Canadian
BBD news-based index and other macroeconomic variables, and then we use the residuals (labeled
RPU) from the regression as a proxy for policy uncertainty in the cash holdings model. By
construction, the residuals are orthogonal to economic uncertainty common to both the U.S. and
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Canada and other macroeconomic factors included in the model. We re-estimate the level of cash
model using RPU in place of the BBD index and report the results in Table A.6 in the Internet
Appendix. The results suggest that our findings are robust to the error-in-measurement correction.
Previous research documents that political uncertainty, which is positively related to
national elections, affects corporate policies and asset prices. Bialkowski, Gottschalk, and
Wisniewski (2008) and Boutchkova et al. (2011) report that firms operating in politically related
industries experience higher stock return volatility during the presidential election periods. Kelly,
Pástor, and Veronesi (2016) find that political uncertainty is priced in the equity stock market.
Julio and Yook (2012) document a negative effect of presidential elections on investments. Xu et
al. (2016) report a positive relation between political uncertainty and firm cash holdings for
Chinese firms. To rule out a possibility that policy uncertainty merely picks up the effects of
political uncertainty, we control for political uncertainty by augmenting the cash holdings model
with an election indicator variable that takes a value of 1 for a presidential election year during the
sample period, and 0 otherwise. The estimation results reported in Table 7 indicate that our results
are robust to controlling for political uncertainty.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
5.3. Additional Analyses
In a robustness check, we rerun the cash holdings regressions with the dependent variable
being the ratio of cash and short-term investment to the book value of assets (i.e., Compustat items
CHE/AT). The regression results reported in Table A.7 in the Internet Appendix indicate that our
findings are robust to this alternative measure of corporate cash holdings.

23

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3051576

We argue earlier that policy uncertainty exacerbates firms’ financial constraints, leading to
their increased precautionary cash holdings. In an unreported analysis, we examine the relations
between policy uncertainty and debt maturity and debt costs. We find that policy uncertainty is
negatively related to debt maturity and positively related to the costs of debt. Moreover, the
stringent debt terms are concentrated among financially constrained firms (i.e., firms with low
credit ratings or no ratings), which is consistent with the findings reported by Tran et al. (2018).
This evidence lends support to a positive relation between policy uncertainty and financial
constraints.
The BBD index is constructed based on three components: The news-based uncertainty,
the uncertainty of future expiration of the tax codes, and the disagreement in the monetary and
fiscal policy. To gauge the effects of individual components on corporate cash holdings while
alleviating concern about possible collinearity among the three components, we rerun the level of
cash regressions with each component of policy uncertainty and report the results in Table A.8 in
the Internet Appendix. The results indicate that the news-based and the tax-related uncertainty
components have positive and significant effect on corporate cash holdings but the fiscal and
monetary policy uncertainty does not have a significant effect on corporate cash holdings. This
result is consistent with the findings of Gulen and Ion (2016) and Nguyen and Phan (2017) for
corporate investments.
As most of the accounting data are available on an annual basis, we use annual data in our
analysis. However, to further check the robustness of our results, we reconstruct variables using
quarterly data and perform analyses with these newly constructed variables. For variables whose
quarterly data are unavailable, we use their annual data instead. Policy uncertainty is measured as
the natural logarithm of the average monthly BBD index value of the preceding quarter. The results
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of the cash level model reported in Table A.9 in the Internet Appendix indicate that the coefficients
of policy uncertainty are all positive (ranging from 0.081 to 0.120) and statistically significant at
the 1% level, implying that the positive effect of policy uncertainty on corporate cash holdings is
robust to quarterly data.
Since our sample includes all firms from the Compustat universe (but excludes those in the
financial and utility industries), there are many small firms that tend to be more susceptible to
policy uncertainty. To alleviate a concern that our results could be biased by the inclusion of small
firms in the sample, we filter out firms with the book value of assets below either $100 million,
$500 million, or $1 billion, and rerun the level of cash regressions. We find that our results are
insensitive to these filters.
Fresard (2010) documents a positive relation between a firm’s cash holdings and its future
market share gains at the expense of industry rivals, and the effect is stronger when rival firms face
more financial constraints and belong to more competitive industries. To the extent that policy
uncertainty exacerbates financial constraints, firms may be concerned about losing market share
to cash-rich rivals, leading them to hold larger cash reserves to preempt competition.
To examine the effect of policy uncertainty on the level of cash conditioned on industry
rivalry, we use the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) as a proxy for industry rivalry. HHI is
calculated as the sum of the squares of market shares of the firms within the same 3-digit SIC code
industry in a given year, where market share is defined as a ratio of a firm’s sales to the sum of
sales of the industry. Using whole percentages of market shares for calculation, HHI ranges from
0 to 10,000; a lower (higher) HHI value indicates higher (lower) industry rivalry. Then we
construct the competitive industry dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if an industry’s HHI
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value is below 1,500 in a given year, and 0 otherwise. We re-estimate the level of cash regressions
augmented with competitive industry dummy and its interaction with policy uncertainty. Consistent
with our predictions, the results reported in Table 8 indicate that the positive effect of policy
uncertainty on the level of cash is more pronounced for firms in more competitive industries.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
In an additional analysis, we re-estimate our cash holdings regressions for high and low
growth subsamples. Specifically, we sort firms into the high and low growth subgroups based on
their market-to-book ratios, which proxy for growth opportunities. Firms are assigned to the high
(low) growth opportunities subgroup if their market-to-book ratios are in the top (bottom) tercile
of the sample. The results reported in Table 9 indicate that the coefficients of policy uncertainty
are positive and significant at the 1% level for both subgroups, implying that policy uncertainty is
associated with an increase in the corporate cash holdings for both high and low growth firms.
[Insert Table 9 about here]
Previous research documents that firms facing higher liquidity risk prefer cash over lines
of credit (Acharya, Almeida and Campello, 2013; Acharya et al., 2014). To the extent that policy
uncertainty increases firm liquidity risk, it may decrease firms’ lines of credit while increasing
cash reserves. We examine the relation between policy uncertainty and firm’s lines of credit and
report the results in Table 10. Following Acharya et al. (2014), we use data from the Capital IQ
database to construct the credit line variable as the ratio of undrawn revolving credit to the sum of
cash and undrawn revolving credit.10 The estimation results indicate a negative relation between

10

We acknowledge that the credit lines data from Capital IQ could be noisy.
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policy uncertainty and firms’ lines of credit in Columns 1-3. In a complementary analysis, we
rerun the lines of credit regressions using the data of a random sample of 300 Compustat firms
provided by Sufi (2009) that are also used by Acharya et al. (2014) in their analysis. The dependent
variable is the Line Credit Dummy, which is an indicator that equals to 1 for firms with positive
lines of credit, and 0 otherwise. The estimated results reported in Column 4 indicate that policy
uncertainty is negatively related to firms’ lines of credit. This evidence further corroborates the
argument that firms increase cash holdings for precautionary purposes.11
[Insert Table 10 about here]
6. Conclusions
We examine the relation between policy uncertainty and corporate cash holdings. Using
the BBD index as a proxy for policy uncertainty, we find robust evidence that corporate cash
holdings are positively related to policy uncertainty. Our analyses suggest that firms’ precautions
and, to a lesser extent, investment delays induced by policy uncertainty lead to larger cash reserves.
Our findings of a positive relation between policy uncertainty and cash holdings for firms with
high growth opportunities highlight the detrimental effects of policy uncertainty on the type of
firms that typically create more jobs, which is also consistent with earlier evidence that policy
uncertainty delays real investments and impedes job creation.

11

We thank an anonymous referee for suggestion to consider lines of credit.
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Appendix A: Variables Definition
Variable name

Construction

Data source

Acquisition

The ratio of corporate acquisition expenditures to
the book value of assets

Compustat

Capex

The ratio of capital expenditures to the book value
of assets.

Compustat

Cash-to-assets

The ratio of cash to the book value of assets

Compustat

Cash-to-net assets

The ratio of cash to net assets, where net assets are
defined as the book value of assets minus cash

Compustat

Cash flow

the ratio of earnings after interest, dividends, and
taxes but before depreciation to the book value of
assets

Compustat

Competitive industry
dummy

An indicator that takes a value of 1 for competitive
industries with the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI) below 1,500, and 0 otherwise. The HHI
index is measured as the sum of market share
squared for firms in the same 3 digit SIC code and
year, where market share is defined as a ratio of
sale to the total sum of sales for this market

Compustat

Dividend dummy

An indicator that takes a value of 1 if a firm pays a
common dividend in a given year, and 0 otherwise.

Compustat

Excess return

the difference between a firm’s annual stock return
in a given year and its benchmark return in the
same year where the benchmark return comes from
the Fama-French 25 size and book-to-market
matched portfolio

CRSP and Compustat

Excess cash

The residual of the level of cash regression

Compustat

Herfindahl-Hirschman
index

The Herfindahl-Hirschman (HHI) index is
measured as the sum of the squares of market
shares of the firms within the same 3-digit SIC
code industry in a given year, where market share
is defined as a ratio of a firm’s sales to the sum of
sales of the industry in a given year. HHI ranges
from 0 to 1.

Compustat

Industry sigma

The average of the standard deviation of the ratio
Compustat
of cash flow to book value of assets over the last 10
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years of firms in the same 2-digit SIC code
industries
Leverage

The ratio of the book value of debts, which
includes short-term and long-term debt, to the book
value of assets

Compustat

Market-to-book

The market value of assets divided by the book
value of assets

Compustat

NWC

The ratio of net working capital without cash to the
book value of assets

Compustat

Policy uncertainty

The natural logarithm of the average monthly BBD
index in a given year.

http://www.policyunc
ertainty.com

PU-fiscal and monetary

The natural logarithm of the average monthly fiscal
and monetary policies component of the BBD
index in a given year.

http://www.policyunc
ertainty.com

PU-news

The natural logarithm of the average monthly
news-based component of the BBD index in a
given year.

http://www.policyunc
ertainty.com

PU-tax code

The natural logarithm of the average monthly taxrelated component of the BBD index in a given
year.

http://www.policyunc
ertainty.com

R&D

The ratio of R&D expenses to sales

Compustat

Size

The natural logarithm of the book value of assets

Compustat

Size-age (SA) index

SA index = −0.737*Assets + 0.043*Assets2 −
Compustat
0.040*Age, where Assets is the log of the minimum
value between actual book value of assets and $4.5
billion, and Age is the minimum value between
firms’ age and thirty-seven years.

Whited-Wu (WW) index

WW index = –0.091*CF – 0.062*DIVPOS +
0.021*TLTD – 0.044*LNTA +0.102*ISG –
0.035*SG, where CF is the ratio of cash flow to the
book value of assets; DIVPOS is a dummy variable
that equals to one if the firm pays cash dividends in
a given year, and zero otherwise; TLTD is the ratio
of the long-term debt to the book value of assets;
LNTA is the natural log transformation of the book
value of assets; ISG is the firm’s three-digit SIC
industry sales growth; and SG is the firm’s sales
growth.

Compustat
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable
Cash /Asset
Cash /Net asset
PU
Book assets ($ million)
Market-to-book
Cash flow
NWC
R&D
Capex
Leverage
Dividend dummy
Acquisition
Industry sigma

N
119,322
119,322
119,322
119,322
119,322
119,322
119,322
119,322
119,322
119,322
119,322
119,322
119,322

Mean
0.140
0.302
104.756
1,012.861
2.243
0.021
0.064
0.083
0.064
0.224
0.325
0.022
0.173

Q1
0.022
0.022
81.106
33.653
1.104
0.002
-0.044
0.000
0.019
0.019
0.000
0.000
0.085

Median
0.073
0.079
104.041
143.239
1.504
0.101
0.057
0.000
0.040
0.175
0.000
0.000
0.138

Q3
0.189
0.233
118.673
728.091
2.361
0.164
0.197
0.069
0.079
0.347
1.000
0.007
0.208

Std. Dev.
0.176
0.864
26.283
2,063.331
2.928
0.363
0.270
0.179
0.073
0.248
0.469
0.060
0.148

Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the full sample. Cash-to-assets is the ratio of cash to
the book value of assets. Cash-to-net assets is the ratio of cash to net assets, where net assets are
defined as the book value of assets minus cash. PU is the average of the monthly BBD policy
uncertainty index in a given year. Market-to-book is defined as the market value of assets divided
by the book value of assets. Cash flow is calculated as a ratio of earnings after interest, dividends,
and taxes but before depreciation to the book value of assets. NWC is the ratio working capital
without cash to the book value of assets. R&D is measured as the ratio of R&D expenses to sales.
Capex is calculated as the corporate capital expenditure divided by the book value of assets.
Leverage is the ratio of the book value of debt to the book value of assets. Dividend dummy is an
indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm pays a common dividend in a given year, and 0
otherwise. Acquisition is defined as a ratio of corporate acquisition expenditure to the book value
of assets. Industry sigma is the average of the standard deviation of the ratio of cash flow to the
book value of assets over the last 10 years for firms in the same 2-digit SIC code industries.
Appendix A provides the definitions of the variables.

33

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3051576

Table 2: Policy Uncertainty and Corporate Cash Holdings
Variable

(1)

(2)

(3)

PU

0.016***
(6.32)
-0.005***
(12.38)
0.008***
(12.78)
-0.020***
(4.63)
-0.110***
(12.96)
0.031***
(18.22)
-0.278***
(28.31)
-0.214***
(34.79)
-0.036***
(21.83)
-0.169***
(26.98)
0.135***
(13.00)
0.135***
(10.35)
No
No
119,322
0.30

0.016***
(6.27)
-0.005***
(11.95)
0.007***
(12.28)
-0.021***
(5.03)
-0.102***
(11.45)
0.029***
(16.92)
-0.236***
(23.15)
-0.204***
(32.37)
-0.030***
(18.54)
-0.178***
(28.04)
0.081***
(9.13)
0.155
(0.01)
Yes
No
119,322
0.32

0.011***
(4.56)
-0.010***
(9.53)
0.005***
(12.04)
0.033***
(7.48)
-0.064***
(9.22)
0.009***
(4.38)
-0.213***
(20.89)
-0.132***
(20.77)
0.004**
(2.51)
-0.142***
(24.19)
0.028***
(4.24)
0.171***
(12.70)
No
Yes
119,322
0.60

Size
Market-to-book
Cash flow
NWC
R&D
Capex
Leverage
Dividend dummy
Acquisition
Industry sigma
Intercept
Industry fixed effects
Firm fixed effects
Number of observations
Adjusted R2

Table 2 reports the results of the cash holdings regressions. The dependent variable is cash-toassets ratio. PU is the average of the monthly BBD policy uncertainty index in a given year. Size
is measured as the natural logarithm of the book value of assets. Market-to-book is defined as the
market value of assets divided by the book value of assets. Cash flow is calculated as a ratio of
earnings after interest, dividends, and taxes but before depreciation to the book value of assets.
NWC is the ratio working capital without cash to the book value of assets. R&D is measured as the
ratio of R&D expenses to sales. Capex is calculated as capital expenditures divided by the book
value of assets. Leverage is the ratio of the book value of debt to the book value of assets. Dividend
dummy is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm pays a common dividend in a given
year, and 0 otherwise. Acquisition is defined as a ratio of corporate acquisition expenditure to the
book value of assets. Industry sigma is estimated as the average of the standard deviation of the
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ratio of cash flow to book value of assets over the last 10 years for firms in the same 2-digit SIC
code industries. Other variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics based on heteroscedasticityrobust standard errors clustered by firms are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and *
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 3: Policy Uncertainty, Sensitivity to Government Spending, and Firm Cash Holdings
Variable
PU

(1)
0.012***
(4.48)

(2)
0.008***
(3.59)

PU × Sensitivity to government spending dummy

0.008**
(2.14)

0.005*
(1.68)

Sensitivity to government spending dummy

-0.02
(1.19)

-0.011
(0.67)

PU × Government contract dummy

(3)
0.037***
(12.18)

(4)
0.018***
(6.08)

0.018**
(2.22)
-0.080**
(2.16)
Yes
Yes
58,142
0.67

Other controls
Firm fixed effects
Number of observations

Yes
No
119,322

Yes
Yes
119,322

0.002
(0.26)
-0.025
(0.62)
Yes
No
58,142

Adjusted R2

0.30

0.60

0.33

Government contract dummy

Table 3 reports the results of the cash holdings regressions. The dependent variable is cash-toassets ratio. PU is the average of the monthly BBD policy uncertainty index in a given year. Size
is measured as the natural logarithm of the book value of assets. Sensitivity to government spending
dummy is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm’s industry sensitivity to government
spending is above the sample median, and 0 otherwise. Government contract dummy is an indicator
variable that equals to 1 for firms with sales to the government exceeding $1 million in a given
year and 0 otherwise. The sensitivity to government spending is measured by the ratio of an
industry’s sales purchased by the government. The regressions control for other variables as
specified in equations (1) but their estimates are suppressed for brevity. t-statistics based on
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firms are reported in parentheses. The
symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

36

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3051576

Table 4: Policy Uncertainty, Pro-/Countercyclical Industries, and Firm Cash Holdings

Variable
PU
Other controls
Firm fixed effects
Number of observations
Adjusted R2
Test of difference in coefficients
of PU of two subgroups:
χ2
p-value

Countercyclical
Industries
(1)

Pro-cyclical
Industries
(2)

Countercyclical
Industries
(3)

Pro-cyclical
Industries
(4)

0.019***
(8.05)
Yes
No
73,973
0.30

0.015***
(5.89)
Yes
No
45,349
0.25

0.018***
(5.73)
Yes
Yes
73,973
0.60

0.006*
(1.85)
Yes
Yes
45,349
0.54

1.42
0.23

Table 4 reports the results of the firm cash holdings regressions for subsamples of firms in
countercyclical and pro-cyclical industries. Countercyclical (pro-cyclical) industries include those
that have industry average coefficients of correlation between sales and annual GNP below (above)
the sample median. The dependent variable is cash-to-assets ratio. PU is the average of the
monthly BBD policy uncertainty index in a given year. Columns 1 and 2 report the results of OLS
cash holdings regressions while Column 3 and 4 report the results of cash holdings regressions
that additionally control for firm fixed effects. The regressions control for other variables as
specified in equations (1) but their estimates are suppressed for brevity. t-statistics based on
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firms are reported in parentheses. The
symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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0.008***
(4.10)
Yes
Yes
95,213
0.58

FC
(1)
0.022***
(9.81)
Yes
Yes
24,109
0.55

Non FC
(2)
0.010***
(3.13)
Yes
Yes
59,661
0.58

FC
(3)
0.014***
(6.57)
Yes
Yes
59,661
0.64

Non FC
(4)

Firm Size

0.012***
(4.56)
Yes
Yes
59,661
0.57

0.012***
(4.63)
Yes
Yes
59,661
0.65

Market-to-Book
Ratio
FC
Non FC
(5)
(6)
0.018***
(7.82)
Yes
Yes
61,374
0.62

FC
(7)
0.006*
(1.80)
Yes
Yes
57,948
0.60

Non FC
(8)

Whited-Wu Index

0.006*
(1.84)
Yes
Yes
61,651
0.57

FC
(9)

0.017***
(8.18)
Yes
Yes
57,671
0.61

Non FC
(10)

Size-Age Index
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Table 5 reports the results of the firm cash holdings regressions for subsamples of financially constrained and unconstrained firms. The
dependent is cash-to-assets ratio. PU is the average of the monthly BBD policy uncertainty index in a given year. Firms are sorted on
the following measures of financial constraints: S&P long-term credit ratings, firm size, market-to-book ratio, Whited-Wu index, and
size-age index. Financially constrained–FC (unconstrained–Non FC) subgroup includes firms with Standard and Poor’s (S&P) longterm credit ratings below (above) investment grade or no ratings, below (above) the sample median of firm size or the market-to-book
ratio, above (below) the sample median of the Whited-Wu index value or the size-age index value. Columns 1 and 2 report the results
of cash holdings regressions for firms sorted on credit ratings. Columns 3 and 4 report the results of cash holdings regressions for firms
sorted on firm size. Columns 5 and 6 report the results of cash holding regressions for firms sorted on market-to-book ratio. Columns 7
and 8 report the results of cash holdings regressions for firms sorted on Whited-Wu index. Columns 9 and10 report the results of cash
holdings regressions for firms sorted on Size-Age index. The regressions control for other variables as specified in equations (1) but
their estimates are suppressed for brevity. Variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard
errors clustered by firms are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.

Other controls
Firm fixed effects
Number of observations
Adjusted R2

PU

Variable

Credit Ratings

Table 5: Policy Uncertainty, Financial Constraints, and Firm Cash Holdings

Table 6: Policy Uncertainty and Firm Cash Holdings – IV Regressions
First-stage IV
Regression
(1)

Variable
Instrumented PU

Second-stage IV
Regression
(2)

First-stage IV
Regression
(3)

0.458***
(42.83)

Polarization
Size
Market-to-book
Cash flow
NWC
R&D
Capex
Leverage
Dividend dummy
Acquisition
Industry sigma
Intercept
Firm fixed effects
Number of observations
Endogeneity test:
Wu-Hausman F-statistic

0.496***
(59.01)
-0.006***
(15.79)
-0.002***
(6.77)
0.020***
(8.03)
-0.018***
(6.00)
-0.002***
(2.77)
-0.154***
(16.51)
0.011***
(3.63)
0.031***
(19.58)
-0.255***
(22.75)
-0.122***
(25.35)
4.332***
(738.34)
No
119,322

-0.008***
(27.30)
0.008***
(42.03)
-0.023***
(11.84)
-0.093***
(39.36)
0.032***
(46.50)
-0.171***
(22.11)
-0.206***
(90.44)
-0.041***
(32.97)
-0.049***
(5.26)
0.170***
(44.66)
-1.915***
(38.58)
No
119,322

Second-stage
IV Regression
(4)
0.195***
(21.20)

0.690***
(52.95)
-0.026***
(23.21)
-0.002***
(7.69)
0.018***
(5.83)
-0.009**
(2.22)
-0.004***
(2.92)
-0.291***
(22.29)
-0.016***
(3.76)
0.029***
(12.04)
-0.185***
(15.38)
-0.223***
(31.02)
4.327***
(539.50)
Yes
119,322

2,763.11***

1,848.39***

Underidentification test:
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic

5,000.31***

1,185.06***

Weak identification test:
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic

5,218.94***

1,194.63***

-0.013***
(24.41)
0.005***
(33.06)
0.034***
(20.14)
-0.059***
(26.17)
0.010***
(14.17)
-0.139***
(17.12)
-0.126***
(52.24)
-0.000
(0.36)
-0.096***
(13.73)
0.066***
(15.18)
-0.678***
(15.93)
Yes
119,322

Weak instrument robust inference:
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Anderson-Rubin Wald χ2

2,847.71 ***

1,840.13***

Table 6 reports the results of the firm cash holdings two-stage IV regressions. The outcome
variable is cash-to-assets ratio. PU is the average of the monthly BBD policy uncertainty index in
a given year. Polarization is a measure of political polarization of the U.S. Senate, which is used
as the instrument for policy uncertainty. Size is measured as the natural logarithm of the book value
of assets. Market-to-book is defined as the market value of assets divided by the book value of
assets. Leverage is the ratio of the book value of debt to the book value of assets. Other variables
are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered
by firms are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

40

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3051576

Table 7: Policy Uncertainty and Firm Cash Holdings – Controlling for Political Uncertainty
Variable

(1)

(2)

(3)

PU

0.017***
(9.39)
0.003***
(3.50)
Yes
No
No
119,322
0.30

0.016***
(9.28)
0.003***
(3.43)
Yes
Yes
No
119,322
0.32

0.011***
(7.42)
0.003***
(3.48)
Yes
No
Yes
119,322
0.60

Political uncertainty
Other controls
Industry fixed effects
Firm fixed effects
Number of observations
Adjusted R2

Table 7 reports the results of the cash holdings regressions. The dependent variable is cash-toassets ratio. PU is the average of the monthly BBD policy uncertainty index in a given year.
Political uncertainty is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for a presidential election year
during the sample period, and 0 otherwise. The regression models include other control variables
as specified in equations (1) but their estimates are suppressed for brevity. t-statistics based on
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firms are reported in parentheses. The
symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 8: Policy Uncertainty, Industry Rivalry, and Firm Cash Holdings
Variable
PU
Competitive Industry Dummy
PU × Competitive Industry Dummy
Other control variables
Industry fixed effects
Firm fixed effects
Number of observations
Adjusted R2

(1)
0.013***
(4.77)
-0.046***
(2.77)
0.016***
(4.49)
Yes
No
No
119,322
0.31

(2)
0.008***
(3.06)
-0.080***
(4.84)
0.022***
(6.22)
Yes
Yes
No
119,322
0.32

(3)
0.009***
(4.07)
-0.016**
(2.10)
0.004**
(2.14)
Yes
No
Yes
119,322
0.60

Table 8 reports the results of the cash holdings regressions. The dependent variable is cash-toassets ratio. PU is the average of the monthly BBD policy uncertainty index in a given year.
Competitive Industry Dummy is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 for an industry with
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) value below 1,500, and 0 otherwise. The regression models
include other control variables as specified in equations (1) but their estimates are suppressed for
brevity. t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firms are
reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively.
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0.016***
(4.18)
Yes
No
No
39,784
0.28

PU

Other controls

Industry fixed effects
Firm fixed effects
Number of observations
Adjusted R2

No
No
39,762
0.30

Yes

0.017***
(6.75)

(2)

Low Growth

Yes
No
39,762
0.32

Yes

Yes
Yes
No
39,784
0.30

0.017***
(6.78)

(4)

Low Growth

0.018***
(4.94)

(3)

High Growth

No
Yes
39,784
0.59

Yes

0.015***
(4.10)

(5)

High Growth

No
Yes
39,762
0.66

Yes

0.015***
(6.78)

(6)

Low Growth

43

Table 9 reports the results of the cash holdings regressions for subsamples of firms sorted on growth opportunities. The dependent
variable is cash-to-assets ratio. PU is the average of the monthly BBD policy uncertainty index in a given year. Firms are assigned to
the high growth opportunities (High Growth) subgroup if their market-to-book ratios are in the top tercile of the sample. Firms in the
low growth opportunities (Low Growth) subgroup include those having market-to-book ratios in the bottom tercile of the sample. The
regressions control for other variables as specified in equations (1) but their estimates are suppressed for brevity. Variables are defined
in Appendix A. t-statistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firms are reported in parentheses. The symbols
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

(1)

Variable

High Growth

Table 9: Policy Uncertainty, Growth Opportunities, and Firm Cash Holdings

Table 10: Policy Uncertainty and Credit Lines
Credit Line

Credit Line

Credit Line

Line Credit Dummy

Variable

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

PU

-0.072***
(14.44)
0.001
(0.11)
-0.023***
(11.78)
0.358***
(26.86)
-0.061***
(8.26)
0.072**
(2.16)
0.279***
(29.58)
0.071***
(20.84)
-0.122***
(7.87)
-0.094***
(9.50)
0.234***
(24.92)
0.032
(1.51)
0.831***
(33.74)
No
No
32996
0.20

-0.072***
(14.65)
0.001
(1.22)
-0.022***
(11.55)
0.340***
(22.74)
-0.057***
(7.99)
0.048
(1.47)
0.273***
(28.24)
0.069***
(20.63)
-0.109***
(7.18)
-0.096***
(7.92)
0.278***
(27.28)
0.029
(1.40)
0.804***
(32.63)
Yes
No
32996
0.23

-0.053***
(14.00)
0.001
(1.37)
-0.002
(1.60)
0.262***
(22.80)
-0.012*
(1.71)
0.089***
(2.96)
0.111***
(11.46)
0.007*
(1.71)
0.016
(0.81)
-0.014
(1.24)
0.528***
(28.11)
-0.039***
(3.35)
0.673***
(34.20)
No
Yes
32996
0.65

-0.119***
(2.85)
0.051***
(3.12)
0.006**
(2.12)
-0.134*
(1.82)
0.019
(1.16)
0.268*
(1.75)
0.110
(1.56)
-0.01
(0.26)
-0.368**
(2.25)
0.087
(0.76)
0.104
(0.92)
0.080
(1.29)
0.977***
(5.17)
No
Yes
1657
0.69

Size
Market-to-book
NWC
R&D
Capex
Leverage
Dividend dummy
Industry sigma
Cash flow volatility
Tangibility
Profitability
Intercept
Industry fixed effects
Firm fixed effects
Number of observations
Adjusted R2

Table 10 reports the results of the credit line regressions. The dependent variable in Columns 1-3
is credit line, which is calculated as the ratio of undrawn revolving credit to the sum of cash and
undrawn revolving credit. Undrawn revolving credit data are obtained from the Capital IQ
database. The dependent variable in Column 4 is the Line Credit Dummy, which is an indicator
variable that equals to 1 for firms with positive lines of credit in the random sample of 300
Compustat firms constructed by Sufi (2009), and 0 otherwise. PU is the average of the monthly
BBD policy uncertainty index in a given year. Other variables are defined in Appendix A. tstatistics based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firms are reported in
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parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
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